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SELECTING MEDIATORS AND REPRESENTING
CLIENTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL DISPUTES'
Harold Abramson'
This paper discusses the role and importance of culturalfactors in
any dispute resolution process. Focusing on mediation, it first
examines the effects of cultural elements in mediation. Then it looks
at different types of mediations: from evaluative to directive
mediation and suggests that the mediation would be more effective
if the cultural background of the parties are taken into account.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Even an adept negotiator can be baffled by cultural differences. When a
negotiation reaches an impasse because of an unfamiliar cultural interest or a
miscommunication between the parties due to different styles of communicating,
negotiating, or decision-making, the negotiator might find it helpful to enlist
assistance from a culturally-trained and culturally-appropriate mediator. This
article considers how such a third party can help you, as a negotiator, bridge
cultural differences. It considers when to seek aid from a mediator, what the
credentials of the mediator ought to be, and the impact of the mediator's approach
on the way you represent your client.

II.

WHEN To ENLIST A MEDIATOR?

In a cross-cultural negotiation, a party may need a process that can address
cultural differences. Parties brought up in dissimilar cultures might require a
process that helps them recognize and bridge their different upbringings. They
may need a process with a mediator who can help them overcome such cultural
gaps as when an Asian or South American party may be more interested in the
relationship than the U.S. party who may be more interested in a detailed contract,
or when the U.S. party wants extensive discovery while the civil law party sees no
need for it. They also may benefit from a mediator who deeply involves the parties,
the ones with the greatest knowledge of the dispute, when the negotiation seems
to be failing because the cultural practice of one side replaces the principal with
her lawyer. By turning to mediation, parties can create a forum in which barriers
that parties may not be able to overcome on their own can be addressed.

These differences can arise in disputes between parties from different countries as

well as between parties within the same country when the parties come from different
regions or from different religious, ethnic, or professional groups.
2
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I recently observed how attorneys can perceptively engage in cross-cultural
analysis when they enlisted assistance from me as a mediator in a pre-mediation
conference. The attorneys informed me that they thought negotiations had failed
so far not because they were not on the same page, but because one of the parties
from a small Western African country could not negotiate with someone whom
he thought had acted so unethically. The party said that where he is from, you do
not deal with someone like the other party. He would rather take a chance in
court and lose, a significant risk according to his own attorney, than settle with
someone who acted so unethically. The attorneys indicated that they needed a
mediator that could help the parties overcome this impasse.

III. WHAT CREDENTIALS SHOULD

THE

MEDIATOR POSSESS?
When dealing with cross-cultural disputes, you need a mediator whose
training and experience goes beyond the familiar basic credentials. The standard
checklist should be expanded to include two additional questions that are
culturally-related: is the mediator trained to deal with cultural differences? And
a second less obvious question, does the mediator approach mediation in a way
that fits the cultural needs of the parties? The next sections consider these two
questions.

A. Is the Mediator Trained to Deal with Cultural Differences?
A mediator should be trained and experienced in helping parties recognize
culturally-shaped interests and overcome culturally-based impasses.
(i) Culturally-ShapedInterests
The primary purpose in a negotiation, like in any dispute resolution process,
is to advance and meet your client's interests, whatever they might be. Some
commentators have critiqued such an interests inquiry as a narrow cultural one,
shaped by western cultural individualism. This simplistic view fails to take into
account other culturally-driven goals such as interdependence and relatedness. 3
A broader view of parties' interests, however, can better capture the full range of
a client's cultural needs, framing each party's cultural upbringing the content of
his or her interests.
Spotting cultural interests can be difficult to do because they can be buried
when positions are presented. A dispute that appears to be primarily about money,
Abdalla, Principles of Islamic InterpersonalConflict Intervention:
A Search Within Islam and Western Literature, 15 JOuRNAL OF LAW & RATIONs 151, 161-

3 Compare Anr
62,

165,

176 (2000-2001); ROGER FISHER

ET

3

AL., GETTING TO YES 41,

48 (1991).
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for instance, might be mostly about protecting a principle, saving face, preserving
relationships, or promoting particular community norms and collectivist
interests. Although these interests are not unfamiliar in the U.S. culture, these
interests can be deeply compelling ones for parties from some non-U.S. cultures.4
In collectivist societies, such as in China and Japan, parties can have an
interest in preserving face, an ingrained personal value that involves being treated
with respect and dignity, maintaining positive relationships, and preserving an
honorable reputation and social standing in the community. "Face-saving"
according to FISHER AND URY, however, "carries a derogatory flavor [in the English
language]. People say, 'We are doing that just to let them save face,' implying that
a little pretense has been created to allow someone to go along without feeling
badly. The tone implies ridicule. ... This is a grave misunderstanding of the role
and importance of face-saving. Face-saving reflects a person's need to reconcile
the stand he takes in a negotiation or an agreement with his principles and with
his past words and deeds."5
Parties also can have an interest in a solution appropriate for the
community. In a study of mediation in an Islamic country, the author found:
The settlement must be an appropriate outcome for the community
as a whole as well as for the actual disputants. The group's interests
guide the process. This is consistent with collectivist culture
generally where communal and societal interests will preside over
individual party interests. It enables this form of mediation to serve
an educative role by articulating the social norms and providing
acceptable behaviours and solutions for the disputants and for the
community as a whole. In this way it differs from western mediations
where confidentiality and privacy constraints, for the benefit of the
individuals involved, limit a wider instructive role.6
Finally, consider this international mediation where a culturally shaped
interest was not being met.7 In a dispute between two businessmen from Latin
America and a U.S.-based multinational company, the lawyer from the U.S.
company could not fathom why the Latin American businessmen wanted an
apology from the U.S company for its apparent negligence in losing a valuable
4

See Jnumm M. BRErr,

NEGOYmJANG GLoBALY: HowTo NEOnATE DERAS, RSOLVE Disps, AND MAKE
DEcISiONs AcRoss CurruRAL BouNDAus 8-9 (2001). See also FISHER, Br AL., supra note 3.
See FisHER, Er AL., supra note 3.

See Black,Alternative DisputeResolution in Brunei Darussalam:The Blending oflmported
and TraditionalProcesses, 13 BOND L. R. 26.
This dispute was mediated by the author.
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commodity. It was not until the U.S. lawyers realized that the two businessmen
had spent on legal fees and travel almost as much money as they were seeking in
court that the U.S. lawyer understood that an interest other than money needed
to be met.
When these sorts of culturally shaped interests might arise in a dispute, you
may want to select a culturally-trained mediator who can assist parties in
recognizing these less familiar and yet essential needs.
(ii) Culturally-ShapedImpasses
Disputing parties can encounter impediments due to their different cultural
upbringings that can foster conflicting wants and approaches to the negotiation.
Any study of culture reveals numerous examples of behavior common in one
culture that could be misinterpreted by someone brought up in another culture.
These misunderstandings of behavior may result in or produce an impasse. When
these cultural differences result in an impasse in a negotiation, you might turn to
a culturally-trained mediator to help generate movement.
An appropriately trained mediator can help you recognize and overcome
culturally-based impasses. The mediator can help you classify an impasse as well
as develop a suitable intervention. The mediator might use the following five
steps. 8

During the first three steps, the mediator prepares for the cross-cultural
negotiation by mastering a cultural conceptual framework, learning about her
own cultural upbringing, and investigating the culture of the other negotiators.
The next two steps provide a guide for the mediator as the mediation progresses.
The mediator approaches the negotiating behavior of others with an open mind
and then helps parties bridge any differences.
These five steps can be illustrated through the use of a hypothetical.
Consider how a U.S. attorney might react when he learns that the other party, an
institutional client from Japan, will not be represented by someone with substantial
settlement authority. Instead, the other side will be represented by a team of
negotiators who will make decisions by. consensus. Furthermore, all the team
members cannot be present in the negotiation session. Under these circumstances,
the U.S. attorney is likely to suspect that the other side is acting in bad faith. The
other side appears to be replacing the person with real settlement authority with
an un-wieldy team of negotiators. How might the mediator proceed?
Harold Abramson, International Dispute Resolution: Cross-CulturalDimensions and
StructuringAppropriate Processes, in PROCEsSEs oF DisPUTE RESOLUiON 918-21 (ALAN RAU ET
AL. eds., 3d ed., 2002).
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First, the mediator comes to the mediation with a conceptual framework
that can help her identify and understand cultural characteristics. The mediator
must be able to grasp the meaning of "cultural behavior" and how it is different
from universal "human behavior." Cultural characteristics have been isolated in
numerous studies of culture, including studies relevant to conflict resolution.,
The hypothetical implicates a cultural characteristic related to the process
of decision-making for each side. This generic characteristic, like virtually all
cultural characteristics, encompasses a continuum bound at each end with a valuebased pole. At one extreme, societies can be found that are hierarchical, with
decisions made by leaders. At the other extreme, societies can be found that are
collective, with decisions made by consensus. The actual cultural practice is rarely
one extreme or the other; it usually falls somewhere between these two end poles
of the continuum. Second, the mediator fills in this conceptual framework with a
deep understanding of her own culture or cultures.o
A skilled mediator must be cognizant of the degree to which her own
behavior is universal or culturally determined, because it is through this personal
lens that the mediator observes and assesses the negotiating behavior of others.
To reduce distortions, the mediator must learn about her own cultural upbringing
in order to appreciate the extent to which her view of other people's behavior
may not necessarily reflect a universal view, In the hypothetical, a U.S. mediator
should be aware that her possible view that organizations tend to be hierarchical,
where decision-making is centralized in "leaders," is not universal organizational
behavior. Third, the mediator strengthens her conceptual framework with an
understanding of the culture or cultures of the negotiator(s).The mediator should
try to identify and research the culture(s) of the clients as well as the attorneys
that will be participating in the mediation. In doing so, the mediator should not
assume that just because a person was brought up in a clearly identifiable culture,
the person will act in accordance with its cultural norms. Furthermore, the
mediator should learn as much as possible about the negotiators as individuals,
that is, learn about their personalities and ways their negotiating behavior may
vary from practices of their culture(s). In the hypothetical, the research might
reveal that one side is from a society in which organizations typically make

9 See, e.g.,

GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S

CoNsEQUrcES (1984); GEFRT

HOFSTEDE,

CULTURES

AND

ORoANIZAToNs: SovrwAnOF THE MIND (1997); DEAN ALLEN Fos-TER, BARGAIENIG AcRoss BoRDRs:
How To NEGoTIATE BusINEss SuccEssFuuY ANYwmR INTHE WORLD 264-72 (1995) (showing
how Hofstede's work relates to international negotiations).

10For studies of American culture, see, e.g., GARY ALTHEN, AMERICAN WAYS xii, 4, 8, 9-10,
14, 17, 24-25, 136-37 (1998); EDWARD C. STEWART &MILTON J. BENmEr, AMERicAN CULTURAL
PATTERNs: A CRoss-cuLTuRAL PsPsECivE (iggi).
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decisions based on consensus, but the research may reveal little about their
individual personalities."
These first three preparatory steps are relatively easy to complete because
they entail collecting mostly accessible information on cultural characteristics.
The next two steps, however, are much more difficult to accomplish because they
require the mediator to suspend judgment and develop strategies during an
intense, dynamic and fast moving mediation session.
Fourth, the mediator withholds judgments about the parties' negotiating
behavior by viewing key behavior with an open mind. This mental process requires
considerable discipline. It is too easy for a person who routinely judges negotiating
behaviour to prematurely judge it in a cross-cultural negotiation. In the
hypothetical, the mediator should not view one side's collective decision-making
process as evidence of good or bad faith; instead she should view this key
negotiating behavior as a difference that needs to be addressed.
Fifth and finally, the mediator searches for ways to bridge any resulting gap
by helping the parties identify the nature of the impasse and by facilitating an
intervention. The mediator might facilitate an interest-based negotiation, a
compromise, or a decision to defer to one side's practice. In the process of doing
so, the parties are likely to learn whether the gap reflects a cultural difference that
can be bridged or a strategic ploy (which also could be cultural) that may impede
or derail the negotiation.
In the hypothetical, the parties appear to have different views of who must
be present in ihe mediation session. The U.S. party expects the other side to bring
a single person with settlement authority, and the other side expects multiple
people to sign off and they all cannot be present.
The mediator could facilitate a negotiated solution by resorting to an
interest-based approach, where the interests behind the different practices are
explicated and respected. In the hypothetical, instead of viewing the Japanese
party's claim that it cannot agree to anything without a consensus as bad faith, the
mediator might focus on how to respect the Japanese party's need for consensus
Nhile still meeting the U.S. party's need for the presence of clients with substantial
,ettlement authority. The parties, for example, could negotiate an arrangement
See Loretta Kelly's description of an Aboriginal Australian representative whose
behavior was sharply at variance with those he supposedly represented. Loretta
Kelly, Indigenous Experiences in Negotiation, in
AND HoNaAN eds. 2oo6).
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in which the Japanese party brings to the negotiation session all the people who
must concur, or at least makes sure the absent people are available by telephone.
Then, in the session, the Japanese consensus approach could be respected by
giving members of its negotiating team ample time to meet privately.
This calibrated approach can smoke out whether the gap is based on a
bridgeable cultural difference or a strategic ploy. It might reveal, for instance, an
ingrained strategic practice such as haggling that includes a last minute demand
by a senior person that is purposely not at the table.
Sometimes, a gap might be bridged by one side simply deferring to the
other side's practice, especially when the other practice is not a deal-breaker or
does not implicate core personal values. For instance, a U.S. attorney may defer
to the other side's formal practices of carefully using titles and avoiding personal
questions about family.
In another example, consider how a mediator might handle an impasse
that can arise when a U.S. lawyer insists that signed business agreements cover
many details and contingencies and the Japanese lawyer displays little interest in
reducing details to writing. The U.S. lawyer will likely interpret this disinterest as
reluctance about the deal or a specific issue. In preparing for a cross-cultural
mediation, a U.S. mediator will realize that his own preference for reducing
everything to writing may be due to his own cultural upbringing and may not be
a universal mode of behavior (step 2). The drafting of comprehensive contracts is
taught in U.S. law schools and reinforced in law practice. A Japanese lawyer may
have been brought up differently (step 3). Instead of being concerned about the
details of a written agreement, the Japanese lawyer may be more concerned about
the business relationship, leaving for the written contract a general statement
about the relationship and basic principles for governing the business deal.
In the negotiations, the mediator would view the reluctance of the Japanese
lawyer to put everything in writing as ambiguous behavior to be viewed with an
open mind (step 4). These different approaches might be investigated by the
mediator asking why the U.S. attorney prefers detailed contracts and why the
Japanese attorney may not. As each side learns more about the other side's
practice, the mediator can focus on ways to bridge this gap. The two sides may
close the gap by respecting the reasons for the different practices. They may
negotiate a compromise in which both sides seek to cultivate a relationship of
trust and then enter into a contract that may cover key obligations but not every
conceivable contingency (step 5).

8
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B. Does the Mediator's Approach Fit the CulturalNeeds of the Parties?"
Asking whether a mediator's approach fits the cultural needs of the parties
can be an unfamiliar but necessary inquiry in order to formulate an effective
cross-cultural process. You may want to inquire what sort of third party assistance
the parties and the other attorney are accustomed to as this can influence the sort
of mediator that they will respond to. This familiar problem-solving approach
may run counter to their experiences, and a result, not be readily acceptable.
You may need to select a mediator whose approach comports with the other
participants' cultural upbringings in order to create an efficacious process.
This mediator selection method, in which cultural preferences drive the
choices, is different from the method I have suggested for selecting U.S. mediators
in a non-cross-cultural context.?3 In that context, parties should select a mediator
that will use an approach that will meet the parties' needs for resolving the dispute.
It is a choice driven by an analysis of the advantages and drawbacks of various
mediator approaches in view of the parties' needs, including possible cultural
considerations.
The culturally-driven selection method suggested here, however, may be
only a intermediary method during this transitional period toward globalization
of mediation practices. I recently saw evidence of the changes taking place when
participating in a U.S.-Chinese Retreat of dispute resolvers hosted by the CPR
Institute. 4 One of the Chinese participants noted that when Chinese companies
negotiate with each other and use a mediator, they prefer a more directive
approach to mediation (the common Chinese practice), however, when Chinese
companies use a mediator with non-Chinese businesses, (i.e. international
disputes), they use a facilitative approach (a new mediation approach in China).
As the practices across the globe expand to encompass a broader range of
mediator approaches, the emphasis in the mediator selection discussion is likely
to shift away from cultural analysis and toward analysis of the various approaches.
Before suggesting a culturally nuanced way to classify mediator approaches,
the term "mediation" needs some clarification and definition. There has been
much debate over what processes can be legitimately called mediation. It seems
to me that it is just too late to convincingly defend a favored, circumscribed
2

Substantial portions of this section are excerpted and edited from
&

CHEW,

NoLAN-HALEY, ABRAMSON

INTERNATIONAL CONFLIcT RESOLUTION CONSENSUAL ADR PROCESSES 123-37 (2005).

13 See HAROLD ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION: ADvocATING IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS

14

133 45 (2004).
The CPR Institute (International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution)
conducted this invitation-only one-and-half day retreat at the Mohonk Mountain
House in October, 2005.
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mediation definition. I prefer a broad, generic definition that has the flexibility of
accommodating the diversity of approaches to third party assistance found around
the globe: Mediation is simply a negotiation conducted with the assistance of a
third party. Instead of focusing on the noun of mediation, I prefer focusing on the
adjective in front of the noun. Is the mediation facilitative, evaluative, directive,
transformative, some mix, or something else? Various adjectives are highlighted
in the classification system in this article.
(i) U.S. Problem-Solving and Self-DeterminationApproach
U.S. practices reflect a culturally shaped view of mediation, a view that is
vividly conveyed in the highly regarded original Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators.'s Its definition of mediation, found in the Preface, reveals much about
the problem solving role envisioned in the United States.
Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party-a mediatorfacilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting voluntary
agreement (or "self determination") by the parties to the dispute. A
Mediator facilitates communications, promotes understanding,
focuses the parties on their interests, and seeks creative problem
solving to enable the parties to reach their own agreement. These

standards give meaning to this definition of mediation. [Italics
added].' 6
This definition, however, has been modified in the recent changes to the
Model Standards to reflect a momentous broadening of the term mediation to
encompass different "styles." The revised definition provides that: "Mediation is
a process in which an impartial third party facilitates communication and
negotiation and promotes voluntary decision making by the parties to the
dispute." According to the Reporter's Notes'8 "It [the new definition of mediation]
is not designed to exclude any mediation style or approach consistent with
Standard I's commitment to support and respect the parties' decision-making
'5

The Model Standards were prepared and approved by three leading organizations in
the United States dispute resolution field: American Arbitration Association, the
Litigation and Dispute Resolution Sections of the American Bar Association, and the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (1992-1994). For a discussion of the

Model Standards by the chair of the drafting committee, see Feerick, Towards
Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators 38 S. TEx. L.R. 455 (1997).
A comprehensive review and revision of the Model Standards was adopted by the
three sponsoring organizations in 2005. See http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/programs/
adr/ (last visited Aug. 20016).
16Id.
1

Id, at Preamble (Sept. 2oo5).

is Id at 7, in Reporter's Notes (Apt. 'o, 2005).
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roles in the process."9 Therefore, this ostensibly broader definition has a firm
limit. It only welcomes those styles of mediation that comport with the
Westernized fundamental principle of party self-determination. This fundamental
policy of party self-determination reflects a distinctively U.S. cultural value that
is not given the same sacred regard in more directive practices found in some
other areas of the globe, as described below under evaluatively directive and
wisely directive mediations.
Although the Model Standards' particular vision of the mediator's role reflect
the dominate approach to training mediators in the United States and a widely
practiced approach, it is not the exclusive one used. No culture can claim a single,
monolithic mediation approach, and the United States is no exception. Two other
widely used approaches are transformative and evaluative mediation.
(ii) Transformative Mediation
A transformative mediator engages in a mediation practice based on
communication and relational theory. Instead of promoting the goal of settlement
for the parties, the transformative mediator allows the parties to determine their
own direction and supports the parties' own opportunities for perspective taking,
de-liberation, and decision-making. The mediator focuses on the parties'
interactions and supports their shifts from destructive and alienating interactions
to more constructive and open interactions (referred to as empowerment and
recognition shifts). In this model, parties are likely to be able to make positive
changes in their interactions with each other and, consequently, find acceptable
resolution for themselves, where such terms genuinely exist?(iii) Evaluative Mediation
Mediation becomes evaluative when the mediator gives recommendations
such as offering his or her views of the strengths and weaknesses of the legal case,
assessing the reasonableness of particular settlement options, or proposing what
might be a reasonable settlement. Mediator power to give recommendations can
be found domestically in the recently adopted AAA International Dispute
Resolution Procedures21 in foreign domestic laws such as the Indian Arbitration

'9

Id.

2

See AmEAmSON, supra note 9, at 71-72; also see

ROBERT A. BARucH BusH & JOSEPH P. FOLCER,
ThE PROMISEOP MEDIATION: RESPONDING To CONFuGT'HROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECoGNITION (1994).
For an extensive resource list, see INsTrrrrE FOR THE STUDY oF CoNFLIC TRAsronmeNow, INc.

at http://www.transformativemediation.org (last visited Mar.
21

14,

2006).

See Rule M-io Authority of the Mediator, American Arbitration Association,
International Dispute Resolution Procedures (including Mediation and Arbitration
Rules), Amended and Effective July 1, 2003.
11
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and Conciliation Act of 1996," and in the United Nation's new Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law.2
The adjective evaluative only refers to the power to offer an evaluation,

not the power to persuade or pressure the parties to accept the evaluation.
However, the mere expression of an evaluation can influence parties, that is assert
a mildly directive influence, without the mediator doing anything more than
offering the evaluation. Thus, an evaluation is inherently directive and therefore
risks diluting the principle of party self-determination. When the mediator goes
the next step and assertively persuades and pressures, the mediation moves pass
mere evaluation toward more directive forms of mediation.
(iv) Evaluatively Directive Mediation
When the mediator evaluates and then pushes his or her evaluation, the
mediator shifts toward an evaluatively directive form of mediation, an approach
that poses a clear threat to party self-determination. This form of mediation is
practiced in the U.S. when mediators implement their evaluative power by either
gently encouraging or by assertively pressing parties to move toward or adopt
their evaluations.
In Continental Europe, the mediator's expected, if not preferred, role can
be influenced by his or her civil law upbringing. In a study that compares mediation
practices in Australia, a common law jurisdiction, with Germany, a civil law
jurisdiction, Nadja Alexander noted that in Germany: "Like the government legal
centres offering conciliation services, most of the dispute resolution processes
associated with these conciliation centres [chambers of commerce] do not follow
an interest-based mediation model. Rather, the processes offered tend to be
directive, interventionist and rights-based in nature."24
There are many mediators within the U.S. and around the globe that are
known to be evaluatively directive, although the particular practices can vary
across a continuum of less to more directive. The. more directive a practice
becomes, the greater the threat to party self-determination.
22

23

The Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996, § 67(4), adopted verbatim the
Article 7(4) of the UNCITRAL 1980 Conciliation Rules.
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 57/18 Model Law on International

Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, Article 6(4), (Jan. 24, 2003). The UNCITRAL Model Law incorporated the
power to make proposals for settlement found in the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules,
Article 7(4 (Report of the UNCITRAL on the Work of its Thirteenth Session, GAOR,
Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement, No. 17, UN Document No. A/35/17 (1980)).
2 See Nadja Alexander, What's Law Got to Do with It? Mapping Modern Mediation
Movements in Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions,13 Boso L.R. 16, 23 (2001).
12
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(v) Wisely Directive and Authoritatively Directive Mediations
In some cultures, disputing parties are accustomed to relying on a "wise"
third party as a source of the "right" answers who will assertively if not aggressively

direct them toward a solution. A wisely directive mediator investigates the
dispute, evaluates it; and formulates and promotes solutions based on the wisdom
for which he or she was selected. That wisdom could be informed by local cultural
norms, religious values, or the mediator's age, legal knowledge, leadership or
authoritative position. Parties expect to receive answers and are receptive to, if
not desirous of, adopting them. There seems to be little regard to protecting
party self-determination. Therefore, while the role of the wise third party may be
to "mediate," the third party effectively functions as a quasi-adjudicator imposing
a resolution on the parties. Wisely directive mediators can be found in some
Islamic, Islamic/Arabic, and Chinese cultures, among other places.25
In Lebanese cultures, George Irani, noted that:
... as in Arab culture in general, the mediator is perceived as someone
having all the answers and solutions. He therefore has a great deal of
power and responsibility. As one participant put it: 'If [the third party]
does not provide the answers, he or she is not really respected or
considered to be legitimate.26
In Egypt, John Murray observed the assertive role of third parties in his
study of three public disputes and his own experiences living and teaching in
Cairo:

25

See George Irani, Islamic Medication Techniques for Middle East Conflicts, 3 M.E. REv.
or INTERNATIONAL AFFAiRs 4 (1999); John Murray, The CairoStories: Some Reflections on
Conflict Resolution in Egypt, 13 NEGOTIATION JOURNAL 39, 53-54 (1997); Ann Black,

Alternative Dispute Resolution in Brunei Darussalam: The Blending of Imported and
Traditional Processes',13 BOND L.R. 16, 26 (Dec. 2001), available at http://

www.bond.edu.au/law/blr/volh3-2/black.doc; SAH AtL-HEMIN, MEDIATION AS A MEANS
FOR AMICABLE SEITLEMENT DisPtrrss INARaB CoUNTRIEs, presented to WIPO Conference on
Mediation, Geneva, Switzerland (Mar. 29, 1996), available at http://
arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1996/hejailan.html; Eric Glassman, The
Function of Mediation in China: Examining the Impact of Regulations Governing the
People's Mediation Committees, io UCLA PAcIFic BASIN LAW JOURNAL 460 (1992); Michael

T. Colatrella, Jr., Court-PerformedMediation in the People's Republic of China: A
ProposedModel to Improve the United States District Courts'Mediation Programs, 15
OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. REsOL. 391, 404-08 (2000); Robert Perkovich, A Comparative
Analysis of Community Mediation in the United States and the People's Republic of
China, to TEMPLE INT'L
26

& CoMp. L. J.

313 (1996).

See George Irani, Islamic Mediation Techniquesfor Middle East Conflicts, 3 Mm. E. REV.
OF INTL Ave. 4 (1999).
13

VOL. 19,(2)

Student Bar Review

2007

***[I]t is acceptable, indeed expected, that the third party will also
apply pressure to help bring about agreement. This is why the
resources and status of the third party are so valuable. Third-party
pressure is welcomed even by those who feel its sting..,27

In a study of traditional rural mediation in Brunei Darussalam, a country
with a strong Islamic influence, Ann Black documented these mediator credentials
and behavior:
Equally important is for the mediator to have good knowledge of the
rules to apply and to employ these to determine what is the right or
fair outcome, and then to direct and guide the parties towards a similar
solution. An ability to persuade, even to coerce parties by moral
imperatives, to a settlement, is an attribute. 28
In the chart below, Ms. Black highlighted differences between traditional
mediation in a collectivist society of the sort she studied in Borneo and the western
form of mediation found in individualistic societies.2 9
Table i. Comparison of Features of Western and
Traditional Mediation

Western/Independent
Mediation
[individualist culture]

Traditional/Iban Mediation
[collectivist culture]
Goal of mediation is to end the
dispute between parties so that
harmony can return to the
longhouse community.

Goal of mediation is for parties to
reach an agreement that ends the
dispute to their mutual satisfaction.
Mediators should not have social
ties, or be related to, the disputants.

Mediators are connected to the
social
disputants
through

Accreditation has objective basis
- such as courses, professional
qualifications, recognition by
authoritative bodies.

relationships or kinship ties.
Accreditation has subjective
basis - trust and respect of that
community. There is no training,
community
other
than
enculturation.

27

See Murray, The Cairo Stories: Some Reflections on Conflict Resolution in Egypt, 13
NEGOTIATION JOURNAL 53-54 ('997).

28

29

See, Black, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Brunei Darussalam: The Blending of
Imported and TraditionalProcesses, 13 BOND L. R. 26 (2ool).
See, Id. at 21.
14

Selecting Mediators and Representing Clients in Cross-CulturalDisputes
Mediations occur in private
settings - an office/ room neutral for
the parties.

Mediations typically occur in a
public setting - rauiof the longhouse.

Mediators should be impartial,
objective and even-handed.

Mediators should be fair, kind,
loving and subjectively appraise
options.

Criticism of disputants' behaviour
or character is unacceptable.

Criticism is acceptable where this
is relevant to the dispute.

Parties direct the outcome
mediator should not persuade or
coerce.

Moral persuasion and coercion
can be justified in the interests of the
longhouse community.

She also observed how this traditional mediator's role, in which the wise
third party promotes particular outcomes, can diminish when people leave the
intimacy of their villages that are bound by social and kinship ties for more
anonymous living in urban areas.
Although most of the mediation case studies that illustrate the work of a

wisely directive mediator have been in community disputes, the practice also has
been described in the mediation of commercial disputes. When considering the
role of the mediator in resolving private commercial disputes (such as intellectual
property disputes) in the Arab world, the Chairman of the Higher Board of EuroArab Arbitration System and a lawyer in Saudi Arabia, Salah Al-Hejailan, gave
this wisely directive characterization of the mediator's role: "The mediator is
normally a person of a prestigious social standing who is known for his thorough
knowledge, honesty and impartiality. Seniority and respect for elders are
particularly resonant in the Arab World. Such a person enjoys the respect of the
disputants who invariablyfeel satisfied with any awardhe may deem appropriate
[italics added]."3o
Even though these historic wisely directive practices have been confirmed
in my recent travels to Turkey and China to discuss mediation practices as well as
in numerous meetings with visiting Chinese, Egyptian, Japanese, Indian attorneys,
and other visiting foreign attorneys, these discussions also hinted at a
transformation that may be taking place. When discussing the nature of wisely
directive practices, the respect for these third parties seem to be diminishing
although not necessarily the clout. Wisely directive mediation may be in the
* See Salah Al-Hejailan, "Mediation as a Means for Amicable Settlement of Disputes in
Arab Countries" presented to WIPO Conference on Mediation, Geneva, Switzerland
(March 29,
1996) at http://arbiter.wipo,int/events/conferences/1996/
hejailan.html (last visited Aug. 2006).
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process of being supplanted with a form of mediation that I call "authoritatively
directive." Although these two sorts of mediators function similarly-as quasiadjudicators, their sources of clout are different. While the wise mediator's source
of influence may be his or her recognized wisdom, the authoritative mediator's
source may be his or her position of official authority, especially in countries with
authoritative governments or collectivism as a pervasive cultural value.?'
(vi) Distinguishing Wisely Directive Mediationfrom Other Settlement
Processes3 2
The dominant function of the wisely directive mediator is similar to the
function of an evaluative mediator in which the third person assesses the merits
of the dispute or solutions, the judge in a judicial settlement conference in which
the third person hints at what she might do in court or urges a particular
settlement, and an arbitratorin nonbinding arbitrationwhere the third person
issues a decision on the merits. In all these processes, the third party offers
evaluations.
It is important to note that parties' responses to the evaluations in the U.S.
differ from the responses to the wisely directive evaluation in other countries. An
evaluation from a U.S. mediator can provide valuable input, however, parties are
relatively free to reject the recommendation and resist any pressure if the mediator
is also directive, with little consequence to the parties. An evaluation as well as
any pressure from a settlement judge can be riskier to repel especially if the parties
want to avoid alienating the judge that might decide the case. Nevertheless, parties
are not shy about resisting pressure when they must to protect their interests - a
proud trait for those brought up in an individualistic society. In addition, a
nonbinding decision from an arbitrator can influence parties without the parties
being pressured by the third party, who will not be further involved in resolving
the dispute.
In contrast, a wise third party's evaluation and pressure is received quite
differently in other cultures. Based on history and experience in a collectivist
society as suggested in the various case studies, disputing parties in other cultures
expect the wisely directive mediator to steer them toward the right solution that
they are then receptive to adopting. Why else would they go to a third party for
help, they would wonder? In short, they expect the third party to dress like a
mediator but act like a wise quasi-arbitrator.

3'

The authoritative mediator may be one appointed by the government to serve as a

Judge to settle cases or as a mediator.
2

This section is based on Abramson's analysis in NoLAN-HALEY, ABRAMSON
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT REsOLUTION: CoNsmsuAL ADR PaocEss 136-137 (2005).
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Although wisely directive mediation may no longer be embraced intact by
either mediators or parties in modern societies, its influence can still be felt in the
mediation preferences of some cultures around the globe, including the possibility
of it shaping an emerging authoritative form of directive mediation.
As should be apparent from these descriptions of wisely directive or
authoritatively directive practices, they offer forms of mediation that seem to
give the least regard to preserving party self-determination.
This section on various adjectives suggests a continuum of cultural
influences and practices around the globe. Any generalizations are risky, especially
because no country has a monolithic approach. Nevertheless, these
generalizations, based on likely cultural propensities, can at least sensitize
attorneys to the range of possible adjectives to look for. A tentative continuum
might be constructed with Chinese and Islamic cultures being the most directive,
Civil Law cultures less, followed by the U.S. and Australian cultures, with English
practices being the most elicitive along with transformative mediation in the U.S.
It remains to be seen whether this continuumu will withstand the ongoing study
of global mediation practices.
This next section considers how a participant s preference point on the
elicitive-directive continuum shapes the resulting mediation process.
(vii) Preferences Grid: Mediation Processes Based on Coalescing Preferences

As LEONARD RiSKIN has emphasized, it takes two to create a mediation process.
It is not formulated by the mediator alone or the parties/attorneys alone. Each
participant can influence the shape of the resulting mediation processA' Rather
than focusing on influence here, however, I will consider how the cultural
preference of each participant, when coalesced in the mediation, produces a
distinctive mediation process. Instead of mapping each participant's ability to
influence the final resulting process, this grid maps each participant's preference.
The preferences grid consists of two axes. The horizontal one maps the
mediator's dominant approach to the mediation. It incorporates RisnN's elicitive-

3 Although this analysis concentrates on one prominent feature of mediation, the

34

elicitive directive continuum along with the corollary party self-determination
continuum, a more nuanced analysis of the adjectives would consider other culturally
distinguishing features. Mediation processes can be further differentiated based on
the degree of impartiality of the mediator and the degree of influence the mediator
has over the parties, whether the mediator focuses primarily on process or on process
and content, the importance of confidentiality, and whether mediator training is
required, among other distinguishing features.
See Leonard Riskin, Decision Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New
Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 1, 37 46 (2oo3).
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directive continuum, a continuum that reflects a range of mediators' approaches
found around the globe. Mediators can be highly elicitive, facilitative,
predominately facilitative, facilitative-directive, and varying degrees of
directiveness. RisKn carefully defines directiveness broadly to include evaluations
and assertive mediator behaviour35
The vertical axis maps the cultural preference of the parties/ attorneys for
third party assistance in resolving disputes?6 It focuses on their preferred
relationship with the mediator. The axis maps a continuum of party/attorney
preferences that ranges from preferring elicitive to directive mediators. You
would expect parties/ attorneys brought up in an individualistic society to lean
toward preferring a more elicitive approach and to be less deferential to a
mediator's directiveness while a side brought up in a more collectivist society is
more likely to prefer a more directive mediatorY'
Parties/Attorneys' Preference
Prefer elecitive Approach

Mediator's

A
Problem Solving

F
Dysfunctional
B

Preference
Elicitive

Evaluative
E
Evaluatively Directive

C

D
Dysfuntional

Wisely Directive

This second axis firmly demonstrates how it takes two to tango-to create
the mediation process. A mediator who is directive, even aggressively so, for
instance, does not necessarily result in the parties/attorneys being deferential
to the mediator's procedural moves or substantive direction. As the second axis
clarifies, the parties/attorneys must be willing partners-that is, be receptive to
a more directive approach for the resulting process actually to be directive.
3 See id.
36

37

The vertical axis reflects the parties'/attorneys' composite preference for a mediator
although the preference of each attorney and each client may differ, especially in a
cross-cultural mediation. A separate preference axis could be mapped for each
participant. The vertical axis in the grid reflects the result negotiated by the
participants among themselves regarding the sort of mediator that they want to
select. Presumably, it is a result that fits the cultural needs of the parties.
But see Christopher Honeyman, et al., Skill is Not Enough: Seeking Connectedness and
Authority in Mediation, 2o NEGoriAToN JoansNA 489 (2004) (comparing U.S. practices

with cormmunity mediations in China and Australia).
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The preferences grid illustrates the importance of the mediator and parties/
attorneys sharing compatible preferences in order for the mediation process to
function, and shows how these preferences shape the resulting process. Consider
several combinations:
If the mediator is extremely elicitive and the parties/attorneys prefer an
extremely elicitive approach, then the result can be a classically problem solving
mediation that preserves party self-determination. See point A.
If the mediator is modestly directive and the parties/attorneys prefer a
modestly elicitive approach, the result can be a classically evaluative mediation
where the mediator offers evaluations and the parties/attorneys give some weight
to them. See point B.
If the mediator is extremely directive and the parties/attorneys prefer an
extremely directive approach, the result can be a wisely directive mediation. See
point C.
If the mediator is extremely elicitive and the parties/attorneys prefer an
extremely directive approach, the mediation process may become dysfunctional.
The parties/attorneys are likely to become quite frustrated because they are not
getting the mediation service that they prefer. See point D.
Within these prototypical results, many gradations may be encountered.
For example, if the mediator is evaluative and considerably directive and the
parties/attorneys prefer a considerably directive approach, the result is likely to
be an evaluatively directive mediation process. See point E. If the mediator is
evaluatively directive and the parties/attorneys prefer primarily an elicitive
approach, the mediation process also may become dysfunctional because the
parties/attorneys are likely to become frustrated with the process. See point F.
In the spirit of RiSKLN's caveats in his article about his "New New Grid
System," this grid hopefully promotes understanding and discussion while
avoiding being so complicated that it becomes confusing and unmanageable.39
The tension between formulating a nuanced grid and one that is easily accessible
is inherent in this undertaking. I also prefer to err in favor of simplicity in order
to present succinctly the encounter between distinctively cultural approaches
of mediators and the preferences of parties/attorneys. The resulting grid,
however, should not be blindly followed as a confident predictor of the resulting
mediation process. Its value is in offering a framework for discerning and selecting
the type of mediator who might formulate the sort of mediation process that may
be effective with your client and the other side.
3o

See Riskin, supra note 34, at 50-53.
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IMPACT OF MEDIATOR'S APPROACH ON
CLIENT REPRESENTATION

After you select a mediator who is culturally trained and suitable, you need
to figure out how to effectively representyour client before that sort of mediator.
Knowing that the mediator is culturally trained does not radically impact your
approach to representation; it only expands the possibilities of what can be
achieved in the mediation. The mediator can assist you in clarifying any culturallyrelated interests of the parties and overcoming any culturally-related impasses.
Selecting a culturally suitable mediator, however, can singularly shape your entire
representation strategy. Your whole approach to enlisting assistance from the
mediator can be shaped by your understanding of how the mediator will approach
the process; in other words, your approach will be fashioned by the "adjective."39
If you select a problem solving mediator (one that will stay in that mode),
you, as the attorney, can advocate as a problem solver.40 You have the freedom
and security to share information including interests, to brainstorm options, to
recognize weaknesses in your client's legal case, and to be open to creative
solutions that go beyond the ones in the legal papers. You can feel secure4' asking
the mediator for help whether to sort out interests, facilitate evaluating the legal
case, or develop multiple options. You also have much freedom and security with
a transformative mediator, who is trained to support whatever sort of process is
structured and implemented by you, your client, and the other side, although
you cannot rely on the mediator's expertise or initiatives to create or direct a
process, as the transformative mediator is committed to being non-directive.
In contrast, consider the impact of selecting an evaluative (non-directive)
mediator on your approach to advocacy. Mediator evaluations can take a variety
of forms, including the mediator assessing the reasonableness of various
settlement options, assessing the consequences of not settling, -or recommending
settlement proposals either as the mediation unfolds or as a "mediator's proposal."
Knowing that the mediator may formulate one or more of these types of

3

The following analysis of how the adjective can shape your representation strategy
is taken from Harold Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations: A Model of
Client Representation, io HARv. NEGOTIATION LAw REv. 103, 124-28 (2005). Also see

NouN-LlEY, ABRAMSON AND CHEW, rERNNTONEA CONFUCr RESOLUTION: CONSENsuALADR PRocEsSES
(2005).
40 For a full discussion on how to advocate as a problem solver, see ABRAMSON, supra note 9.
4' But see the section on mediation's structural biases in Christopher Honeyman,

UnderstandingMediators in THE NOTIATOR's FiEmoox (SCJMEODER AND Houwmakn, eds.,
2006).
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evaluations can induce you to approach the mediation more like an adjudicatory
process than a negotiation. Instead of formulating a negotiation strategy based
on candid conversations with the mediator and meeting parties' interests, you
are apt to return to the traditional adversarial approach, so familiar in the
courtroom, in which you withhold unfavorable information, hide any flexibility
to avoid implying a lack of confidence in the legal case, and present carefully
crafted partisan arguments and positions that are designed to persuade a decisionmaker to act favourably.
Alternatively, you might problem solve, but in a selective way that reduces
the risk of an unfavorable assessment by the mediator. In such a constricted
problem solving approach, you still share and advocate your client's interests
and engage in problem solving moves such as brainstorming options and designing
creative solutions, but only up to a point. You will avoid sharing information or
showing flexibility that may risk a less favorable evaluation from the mediator.
This carefully calibrated strategic plan can dilute the potential of a problem solving
process by limiting the ability of parties to uncover optimal solutions. Withholding
information may bury valuable data and insights relevant to devising solutions.
Hiding flexibility may cramp the opportunity to search for, and devise, creative
solutions. But, in return, you can secure an evaluation that might spur parties
toward settlement.

As a mediator's approach moves further toward the end of the directive
continuum, your problem solving approach will become more constricted until
it morphs into a traditional adversarial strategy. When the mediator's approach
becomes highly directive, or wisely directive, you are likely to view the mediator
as a decision-maker and will advocate accordingly.
Finally, this discussion implies that a mediator will stay within the selected
approach throughout the mediation process. But RISKIN reminded us that
mediation is not a static process. Some, if not many, mediators purposely vary
their roles as the mediation progresses by facilitating at one point, evaluating at
the point that seems useful, being directive when necessary at another point, and
returning to facilitating when it seems appropriate-a practice that they espouse
as necessary for resolving disputes.4 Unfortunately, RismuN omitted assessing the
impact of this mediator practice on how attorneys represent their clients. When
the mediator freely switches roles, you are likely to abandon a nuanced
representation approach and adopt the safest mode of client representation, an
adversarial one, because it is likely to provide the best protection against an
unfavorable evaluation.
See Riskin, supra note 34, at 13-17,

17-21, 28-29

either foster or impair party self-determination).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article suggests when you might want to bring in a mediator to help
parties resolve a cross-cultural dispute. When you decide to do so, you should
consider enlisting a third party who is both culturally-trained and culturallysuitable for the dispute. After selecting the mediator, you need to contemplate
how to effectively represent your client in the process. There is no one all-purpose
strategy that will maximize the opportunitits before every sort of mediator. The
optimum advocacy approach depends on the sort of mediator selected.

22

